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THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 
324 Dearborn St., Chicago, III. 

London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company 



AN OUTLINE SKETCH 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS 



by y 
HIRAM M. STANLEY 

Member American Psychological Association, Author of "Evolutionary- 
Psychology of Feeling," and "Essays on literary Art." 



» 



CHICAGO 
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 

(London Agents : Kkgan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.) 

1899 

t 



\ 



^ 



38231 

Copyright, 1899 

BY 

The Open Court Publishing Co. 
Chicago 

(Wi)COHif;a K£C£IV£D f 










|&*fcr of Wf 3 







CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Preface i 

Definition of Psychology 3 

Knowing . x 4-29 

Sensation and Perception 4-14 

Sight 4-10 

Touch . 10-13 

Hearing 13-14 

Smell, Taste, Etc. 14 

Memory 14-22 

Image . 14-20 

Knowledge 16 

Name 17 

Forgetting 18-19 

Illusion and Recognition 20 

Association 20-21 

Imagination 21 

Ideation a?id Introspection 20-28 

Idea 22-24 

Class and Definition . . 24-25 

Introspection . . . 25-26 

Induction — Deduction 26-28 

Summary of Knowing 28-29 

Feeling and Will 29-36 

Emotion 29-32 

Pain and Pleasure 30 

Will 32-36 

Effort 32 

Work, Play, Habit 32 

Instinct 32 

Freedom of the Will 33-35 

Reflex and Idea — Motor Action ..... 35-36 

Special Psychology 36-44 

Biological 37 

Psychophysical 37 

Physiological 38 

Pathological 39 _ 4o 

Psychical Research 41 

Evolutionary 41-42 

Social 4 2 

Higher 43 

Practical . 43-44 



PREFACE. 

The main object of a beginner in Psychology 
is to acquire psychic insight and familiarity with 
method, and I have tried to keep this end in 
view in this little book. The student from the 
very beginning should be told as little as possi- 
ble, but should learn and conclude for himself 
from the simplest observations and experiments. 
Hence the teacher should see that the scholar in 
all cases does the original exercises at the point 
indicated in his own reading, writing them in the 
blank pages provided at the end of the book; 
and the teacher should to some extent repeat 
and expand these exercises in the class. I have 
given no references to other books, and outside 
reading I consider to be confusing to the begin- 
ner; though, of course, the teacher should be 
familiar with the standard literature of the sub- 
ject. In my opinion Psychology should be a 
subject for the high school, academy and second- 
ary school, and this sketch is particularly designed 
for such work, but will, I hope, be found useful 
with beginners of any age, especially with those 



PREFACE. 



studying without a teacher, and in summer 
schools. As will be obvious, my method has been 
to give complete continuity to the treatment, 
and to proceed from the known to the unknown, 
the particular to the general, and to incite con- 
stant original and vigorous activity on the part 
of the student. The teacher in assigning lessons 
should bear in mind that each original exercise 
is equal to at least one page of text, and that the 
main work of the recitation period should be the 
ascertaining that each student has practical 
mastery of the subject as evinced in the original 
exercises. I am indebted to Miss S. L. Sargent 
of Ferry Hall Seminary for many practical sug- 
gestions. 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

Sensation and Perception. 

AFIRE gives out heat and light, and we study 
exactly and specially about such things as 
fire, heat, light in the fire and sunbeam, etc., and 
we call the knowledge we attain a science, and 
name it Physics. But some things have not 
merely heat, light, etc., but life, as we say the cat 
is a live thing, but the flaming coal is not a live 
thing. The results of exact and special study of 
living things we call the science of Biology. 
Now Biology may study the living being in its 
bodily parts by which it maintains its life, as in 
its legs, heart, lungs, and this division we term 
Physiology; or Biology may study the living 
being for its mental parts or processes, that is for 
its consciousness by which it maintains its life, 
as seeing, making an effort, fearing, and this 
division we call Psychology. You are crossing 
a railroad track, and you see an engine coming, 
you are afraid of being run over, and you make 



4 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

an effort to get out of the way; by such mental 
states you save your life many times a day. 

Write down in the pages at the end of this book three 
recent examples, perhaps in to-day's experience, of 
advantage to your life from your mental states. 

As our own mental states or states of con- 
sciousness are to help us adapt ourselves to the 
world about us, those states which specially give 
us information of our surroundings, like seeing, 
for example, are very useful. We all know at 
what a disadvantage a blind person is in getting 
along in the world; and we know how hard it is 
to walk safely home on a pitch dark night, unless 
we see lights to guide us. But in returning 
home at night you look out for the light in your 
home, and are guided by this consciousness of 

BRIGHTNESS. 

Write down three instances in your recent experience 
where your sense of brightness was of value to you. 

On awakening this morning you noticed that 
it was light, and you distinguished between the 
pure white light streaming in the window, and 
dim greyness near the window, and black 
shadows in the corners of the room. Thus the 
three most noticeable intensities of brightness we 
call white, grey, and black, though a sharp eye 
can distinguish about 700 different degrees of 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 5 

brightness between dead black to dazzling 
white. 

But what else do we see in this room besides 
various intensities of brightness? We see colors, 
as in the chair, table and wall; and we depend 
largely upon our sense of color to distinguish 
things apart. If a stranger asks you the way to 
a certain man's house, you may say, "A brown 
house on the right." 

Write down three instances of the use of perceiving 
colors, if possible out of your recent experience. Name 
and enumerate what you think the principal colors. 

We have about twenty common names for 
colors, but experiment shows that we can distin- 
guish about 30,000 colors. This, of course, 
includes all mixed colors, like greenish-blues, 
and all shades, like dark reds. You notice that 
a dress or coat is of a different color by lamp- 
light than by daylight, and if you turn down the 
lamp to a certain point all colors appear black. 
Black, grey, and white are not real colors, but 
degrees of brightness. Some people are blind to 
all colors, and see objects as only black, grey 
and white, and some see only certain colors. 
Many of the lower animals are partly or wholly 
color blind. Red as the color of blood and flesh, 
and green as the color of vegetation, are proba- 
bly the first colors to attract the attention of 



6 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

animals because they are the usual colors of 
their food. 

How faint a color or brightness can we per- 
ceive? Does this depend upon what we may 
now be perceiving? 

Ask some one to bring a lighted candle or a small 
lamp into a sun-lit room, and standing with your back 
to the door try to perceive the additional light. Grad- 
ually darken the room till you perceive the increase of 
illumination. 

You know that there is more light in the room 
when the candle is lit, but you say you cannot 
perceive the increase, because it is so small. 
How small an increase can you perceive? The 
necessary increase has been measured, and in the 
case of light, it is i-ioo So if the light in the 
room is 200 candle power you would not perceive 
one candle, but must have at least 2 lighted can- 
dles brought in to perceive an increase in the 
illumination of the room. Now within a wide 
range of light intensity this proportion of 1-100 
is the necessary increase or decrease in order to 
note a least perceptible difference in the light, 
and this definite proportion is called after its dis- 
coverer, Weber's (Vaber's) law. 

Why do we not see the stars in the daytime? Why 
does the sunlight make red-hot coals look black? 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 7 

Do we see anything besides brightness and 
colors? You say, " I see a table which is brown, 
a light brown, and I see also that it is quite long 
and broad and high." You have then a conscious- 
ness of space in three dimensions, length, breadth 
and thickness. 

Take the measure of the nearest table with your eye, 
and set your estimate down in feet and inches. 

You see the length by running your eye over 
the table. Of course you do not mean that your 
eye actually runs on the table, which would be 
ridiculous, but that you take account of the 
changes of feeling in the eye when you adjust to 
see the near and then the farther end. 

Try this again and notice particularly how you notice 
the length through changing the focus of the eye. 

If you are asked how many feet long the table 
is you measure it with your eye, that is, you make 
a number of regular focusings which you have 
before learned answer for feet. Merely through 
feeling the movement of the eye you perceive 
the length of the table, but to see the length of 
the street in front of your house you must move 
head and body to enable the eye to " run over 
the street," that is, for the picture of the street 
to run over the eye. Breadth we appreciate 



8 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

through feeling of focusing and sidewise move- 
ment of the eyes. 

Can we see any length or breadth except by 
such feelings of eye adjustment? Have you not 
often been looking out of the window and a tree 
was in your field of vision, yet you, thinking of 
something else, did not definitely see the tree? 
You merely had a sense of patch of green indefi- 
nite in length and breadth, but not till you 
focused the eye on the tree did you see it as an 
object of definite length and breadth. So when 
you are looking straight ahead of you, you are 
aware of certain patches of color at the right and 
left, which you may turn and look at, and really 
perceive in their real dimensions. Thus in a very 
vague and limited way we are aware of length 
and breadth before we focus the eye; but it is in 
the adjusting and focusing that we get the real 
and full perception of space in its dimensions. 
Now in looking absentmindedly out of the win- 
dow and being barely aware of patches of green, 
brown, etc., we call these states sensations of 
sight, as distinguished from perceptions when 
we really see things by adjusting the eyes. We 
get a sensation of light the moment we wake in 
the morning, but we see the light by directing 
our eyes to the window. A baby a few days old 
does not seem to fix its eyes on anything, but gets 
for the most part mere passing indefinite sensa- 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 9. 

tions. But it gradually learns to fix its eyes on 
things, and thus turns its sensations into percep- 
tions. Older people turn their sight sensations 
into perceptions so rapidly and easily that they 
can hardly catch the sensation by itself as a sin- 
gle state of consciousness. Yet lying in a ham- 
mock on a summer's day and half dozing, our 
consciousness seems to be mostly mere sensa- 
tions, not only of sights, but sounds, odors, etc* 
We perceive nothing, we feel everything. 

We have thus far found how we see the di- 
mensions of length and breadth, but how do we 
see the table as standing out from and above 
other objects, as being more than a flat surface, 
that is as being a solid body? 

Set a table, perhaps better a chair, a foot or two from 
the bare wall of the room, and going to the other side 
look at it with both eyes, and note how it stands out 
from the wall, and then with one eye, and note if it does 
not seem to close up and flatten against the wall. If 
again you look with both eyes, the space between the 
wall and chair quickly enlarges and the chair seems to 
move toward you. 

We conclude then that seeing things as not flat 
but solid comes from our using both eyes, and is 
the result of combining the two pictures, one from 
the right eye and the one from the left eye, into 
one picture. We have all looked through a 



IO PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

stereoscope by which we see by means of lenses 
two flat pictures combined into one, where the 
objects appear solid and before and behind each 
other. So we use our eyes stereoscopically in 
seeing the solid chair set out from the wall; each 
eye gets a picture of the chair from a slightly 
different point of view, but we see only one chair. 

Our eyes are then a sort of double camera with 
which we take every day thousands of colored 
stereoscopic photographs. It was seeing in this 
way that we came to school this morning, 
through noting brightness, color, and distance of 
the school building as a solid object before and 
behind other solid objects. If all mankind were 
suddenly struck blind, civilization would cease, 
and man would probably lose his superiority to 
the wild beast, who would come in and drive him 
from his homes. 

But though sight is so useful, if you had no 
other sense of things than the images which sight 
gives, it would be of no real value. Suppose you 
had never been able to perceive anything except 
by sight, and standing on the railway track you 
saw an engine coming. The visual image would 
get bigger and bigger, yet though the engine 
touched you, struck you and hurt you, you would 
feel no touch and might be killed. You would 
gaze at the engine with the same ignorance as a 
little child. But you have had contact with 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. II 

things, you have touched them, felt them hard, 
and so what were mere pictures become real 
things. Thus we know that the panorama which 
sight gives, means possible touch experiences. 
When you see a cnair, you know you could sit in 
it. Sight is plainly most useful in enabling us to 
recall the touch value of things far beyond our 
body. By the skin, especially the skin of the 
hand, you feel things as hard and soft, rough and 
smooth, sharp and blunt. By touching you also 
notice warmth and cold; also in a limited way 
you notice distance, as when you span with your 
hands, or pace with your feet. 

The world of the blind is a world of touch, 
just as if we were always shut up in a dark room, 
and could only feel our way. When a blind 
person has his sight restored by a surgical oper- 
ation does he see things at once as we do? Here 
is a case of a boy : " When he saw he was so far 
from making any judgment about distances that 
he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes 
(as he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin, 
and thought no Qbjects so agreeable as those 
which were smooth and regular. He knew not 
the shape of anything nor any one thing from 
another, however different in shape or magni- 
tude : but upon being told what things were, 
whose form he before knew from feeling, he 
would carefully observe, that he might know 



12 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

them again. But, having too many objects to 
learn at once, he forgot many of them, and (as 
he said) at first he learned to know and again 
forgot a thousand things in a day. Having often 
forgot which was the cat and which was the dog, 
he was ashamed to ask ; but catching the cat 
(which he knew by feeling), he was observed to 
look at her steadfastly, and then, setting her 
down, said: * So, puss, I shall know you another 
time.' " We notice that, though the boy per- 
ceives the cat, he does not know it at once as 
the cat of his touch world, but by feeling of the 
cat at the same time that he looks at it, he con- 
nects the two sensations, he learns the cat so 
that the next time he sees the cat he will know 
what it is, will know how it will feel without hav- 
ing to touch it. Now you when very young 
learned in the same way, chair, table, tree, grass, 
etc., to know their touch value when you saw 
them ; and you can watch infants engaged in 
learning things, grasping and handling whatever 
they see. Even now if a strange object is shown 
to you, you touch it and feel of it so that you 
may really know it, and if you touch a strange 
object in the dark, you bring it to the light to 
see if you can recognize it. Again, you say that 
you saw a man sitting in that chair, but you 
make yourself absolutely sure that you were not 
dreaming or mistaken by going up and touching 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 1 3 

him. If we see something, but by touch find 
nothing, we say we have an illusion or hallucina- 
tion of sight. When we " cannot believe our 
eyes," we find tl\e final proof of reality with our 
hands. 

In what other ways do we become acquainted 
with the world about us beside sight and touch? 
This morning you were called to breakfast by 
the bell ringing ; the clapper jarred the metal, 
and this the air, and those waves of air you were 
acquainted with by the sense of hearing. If you 
had not heard the bell, you might have missed 
your breakfast. 

Mention three instances in your recent experience 
where hearing was of great life value. 

When a fine bell rings you say, " What a good 
tone the bell has ! " When a firecracker explodes 
you say, " What a noise ! " Noises we call by 
such names as hiss, crack, pop, etc.; tones are 
pitched high or low from shrillest treble to 
lowest bass. We can hear some 11,000 different 
tones and some 500 different noises. Many 
people are deaf to very high notes, as the squeak 
of a mouse, or the very low notes, as the tremu- 
lous deep bass of a locomotive exhausting into 
the stack. Besides classifying sounds as noisy 
or tuneful, we also note them as loud or soft, and 
as short or prolonged. If you whirl round a few 



14 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

times you feel giddy, which feeling probably 
comes from a disturbance of the delicately poised 
organs of the ear. 

You heard the bell, and came to breakfast; 
you saw what there was to eat, bread, etc.; you 
touched it with the hand and lips. But did you 
not have some other kind of acquaintance with 
the food? Did you not smell and taste, and did 
not this help you to decide what was best to eat? 
You ate what smelled and tasted good. Though 
smell and taste are useful to us, they are much 
more useful to many of the lower animals. 

Give five instances of this use. 

We can taste four kinds, sour, sweet, bitter 
and salt; but we smell a large variety of odors. 
Besides the sensations we get from eye, skin, 
ear, nose and mouth, we get from other parts of 
the body other sensations, as strain, pressure, 
hunger and thirst. 

Memory. 

We have briefly surveyed the chief ways in 
which we become acquainted with our own 
bodies and the world of things about us. But if 
we had only these bare immediate perceptions 
of things, these would not help us much ; with- 
out memory of our past experience we would be 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 15 

run over at the first street crossing, because we 
did not remember that a horse could harm us. 
We would be like infants, all things would be 
ever new and strange, and we would not know 
at to-morrow's breakfast table when we see bread 
that it is bread and has its peculiar tastes. With- 
out memory the bread would be an entirely 
strange object, as it would be to a savage or child 
who should see bread for the first time. 

But let us see just what memory is. Suppose 
while you are eating breakfast some one moves 
a strange object, say an orange, just into your 
range of vision on one side, your first impression 
is a mere sensation of an indefinite colored mass, 
but directing your eyes to it, you have a percep- 
tion of it as definite color and brightness. You 
then touch, smell and taste and thus become 
further acquainted with it. You put it back on 
the table, and looking at it again, you say: " That 
is a thing which feels, smells and tastes in a 
peculiar way which I have just experienced." 
That is, what you see in looking at it a second 
time is not merely what you saw the first time, 
but the object as possibly to be re-experienced. 
You have retained or remembered your touch, 
etc., experience and interpret your second vision 
of orange by this. Thus to the sight the orange 
has by memory a meaning as something which 
has been once experienced and may be re- 



1 6 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS- 

experienced. So the next morning when you 
see the orange on the table you know what it is, 
at once know how it tastes, feels and smells 
without having to go through the experience of 
the first morning. The usefulness of the memory 
is thus not barely connecting a certain past 
experience with a certain sight, as of orange, 
but in anticipating. We anticipate that what 
has been, will be ; and thus really know what 
things are, as we know what an orange is after 
one experience. Thus we do interpret the future 
by the past ; we expect the orange to have 
its own taste, and not taste like an onion or 
potato, which is the law of uniformity in mind 
which is brought about by the uniformity of all 
nature- 

We say we perceive bread, butter or orange on 
the table, that is in perceiving the thing we 
perceive what it is, and so memory enters into 
our perception. We really remember the bread 
and the butter every time, as truly as we remem- 
ber the orange the second morning we see it. In 
asking what it is we are appealing to past expe- 
rience and implying future experience. We thus 
have knowledge, know bread, butter, orange, 
recognize and identify them for their real value 
in experience, and such knowledge is plainly of 
the utmost value to us in every act of daily life, 
at the table, on the street, etc. 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 1J 

When you see a strange thing and test it by 
other senses you ask, "What do you call it?" and 
are told its name, orange. That is, a certain 
order of sounds is made, which has a meaning 
for you as indicating a certain visible, tactual, 
odoriferous, tasteful thing, and if I say, "Come to 
my room and I will give you the orange," you 
urfderstand. So the name is a great help to 
knowledge, as denoting what may be experi- 
enced, and thus we use not merely our own past 
experience, but that of others. So when a friend 
says, " Here is a fresh orange, sweet, juicy, 
delicious," you try it with confidence. While 
animals have not such definite articulate sounds 
as words to denote the experience which things 
give, yet they have cries and other vocal signs 
which answer the purpose. Thus a hen by its 
cluck tells its chicks, " Here is food t" But civil- 
ized men not merely have a spoken language, 
but a written language. The certain lines next 
you see on the page, ORANGE, are stamped on 
the paper and they are a sign to you of the vocal 
sound, orange, which is a sign for the object 
itself. So when you read the printed word, 
orange, you understand what is meant. By writ- 
ing and printing you can tell about the orange 
and other things to people far beyond the sound 
of your voice. In this way also persons who 
lived hundreds and thousands of years ago tell 



1 8 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

us their experience, and we can profit by what 
they learned. But though the word, spoken and 
written, is of the utmost importance in convey- 
ing our experience to others, it is by itself of no 
real value to us. Thus if I say, " An orange is 
sweet," but you never have tasted a sweet 
thing, though you hear the word " sweet" plainly 
enough, you will not understand any more than 
the blind man would understand the word 
" yellow," when I tell him, "An orange is yellow." 
Hence it is plain we do not increase our knowl- 
edge by merely repeating words. So though you 
were able to repeat the words of this book per- 
fectly, you would not learn any psychology, 
unless you understand, that is connect with your 
own experience, test, observe, and recall by your 
own experience. Words can not do away with 
experience on our part, and we should never be 
deceived into thinking that being able to repeat 
mere words makes knowledge. 

We have now the object, orange, sensed and 
perceived in five ways, remembered and named. 
But we know that memory is imperfect, that the 
orange can be forgotten. If I did not see an 
orange till ten years after my first experience, I 
might then not recognize the orange at all, it 
might seem as strange as the first time I saw it, 
and I might have to learn it all over again, 
either by others telling me or by testing it for 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 1 9 

myself. But I might have some dim, confused 
remembrance that I had once eaten an orange, 
and try to recall it. As trying to see, hear, etc., 
is called attention, trying to remember, we 
speak of as recalling or recollection. 

Let us now study memory a little closer. 
When you see the orange the second morning 
you see it as being yellow, round, etc., just as 
you did the first morning, but there comes up 
also another image seen with " the mind's eye," 
the yesterday's morning vision. You see many 
things in memory almost as plainly as if they 
were before you, as when you think of your room 
at home or of your mother or father. But in 
general the memory image is fainter than the 
perception; as time goes by, unless there is some 
renewal by perception or else a constant brood- 
ing in the mind, the memory image becomes 
fainter and fainter till it practically fades away. 
We say then that we have forgotten, as a man 
might easily forget the orange if he saw it but 
once in his lifetime. Many believe that we never 
absolutely forget any experience, but that some 
occasion may revive it. 

When on the second morning you have the 
two images of the orange, the visual and the 
memory, you do not see two oranges, you see 
one and the same orange. That is you feel that 
the memory image is a mere memory image 



20 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

derived from the past experience. Sometimes 
images of the past come up before us so strongly, 
that we may really think we are seeing the 
object with our eyes. This taking the memory 
for a perception we call an illusion. But for 
the most part in remembering, we not only 
have the image of orange but know it to be 
mere image, and related to past experience of 
orange, and which we may apply in knowing 
the meaning and value of present experience. 
Thus recognizing the orange involves all these 
four steps. 

Recall the orange or the bread you had for breakfast. 
Does anything else beside orange or bread appear in the 
representation? 

You say you remember tablecloth, dishes, 
persons at table, and so on. That these repre- 
sentations come up naturally in association in 
memory, is the law of association in perception, 
and in general mental states once connected 
together tend to revive together. If I mention 
orange or bread you will be reminded of the 
table, the persons eating, perhaps also what was 
said, and even how things smelt and tasted. 
Thus every memory image we have is sug- 
gested, or called up in some way, and this image 
may call up another image, and so on for an 
indefinite train of images. So I say " Winter," 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 21 

it suggests snow, sleigh-bells, tinkling, skat- 
ing, etc. A dream is a train of images we have 
when asleep, and so not perceiving our real sur- 
roundings, we take the images for real percep- 
tions. Dream images may be suggested by some 
internal stimulus, as too much mince pie eaten 
late at night, or there may be external stimulus, 
as a young man smelling heliotrope perfume 
dreamed he was in a bed of flowers. 

Write down two trains of association suggested by 
the word cat. Write down some recent dream, and 
note the connections of association. 

Are our memory images always exact dupli- 
cates of our perception, or do they sometimes 
get changed? You remember an orange as 
about the size of an apple, but you can think of 
it as being as small as a pea or big as a pumpkin. 
When in any way our memory image is changed 
we call the representation imagination or fancy. 
I never saw an orange as big as a pumpkin, but 
I can imagine it. But even with Alice in Won- 
derland imagination is merely changing the 
materials of memory, and must rely on them. So 
if the giant goes seven leagues at a step, he 
must still put one foot before the other. 

Write down one instance in your recent experience of 
imagination, and write one which you have heard or 



22 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

read, and show in each how much is derived from the 
memory and how much from the fancy. 



Ideation and Introspection. 

From our studies so far we now understand 
how our experience of the world is built up by 
a vast deal of connecting perceptions and of past 
experiences as implying future experiences. 
Each one of us has thus constructed his own 
world, his house, family, street, city, and other 
places he has visited, and from what he has 
heard and read, he imagines a vast world beyond 
more or less like what he has already expe- 
rienced. 

We have thus far been able to sense and per- 
ceive the thing, as the orange, in Various ways, 
to remember it, to imagine it, name it, to associate 
it, but so far we have dealt only with particular 
things, as the orange, the single identical orange. 
And it is probable that the knowledge of 
a young child reaches no further. Thus, if a 
child eats an orange one day, and you offer him 
another orange the next day, he will not recognize 
it as another orange, but as the same particular 
orange. The child does not see any reason why 
his eating the orange should cause it to disap- 
pear as orange. But you, if you eat an orange 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 



23 



one morning, and the next morning see a yellow- 
ish round object on the table, do not think it 
the same you had yesterday, but another like 
object, and applying the same name, orange, it 
becomes more than a particular name, that is, it 
becomes a common name for any one of a class 
of objects. From repeated experiences you 
group all round, yellowish, smooth, fragrant, 
sweet things into one group, and call any one an 
orange, and then you say that is your idea of 
what an orange is like, that is, round, yellowish, 
smooth, fragant, sweet. An idea is thus a gen- 
eral image or representation, and is often called 
concept. And the process of getting ideas we call 

THINKING. 

Write down your idea of a house, that is, what makes 
any house, also your memory-image of your house. 
Write two other ideas of common objects. 

The use of ideas in life is plain, and it is one 
great object of education to give us clear and 
true ideas of things. So in studying physics, 
botany, zoology, we are getting ideas. We are 
guided by our ideas in what we do in every-day 
life, by our ideas as to good and bad things. If 
we had no idea of things in classes, we could 
never think of an orange, it would always be the 
orange, and hence if we saw the orange de- 
stroyed, we would not think of another or look 



24 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

for it or call for it. Your idea of house enables 
you to know a house when you see it. 

To have an idea is, as we say, to make a class, 
as oranges. Now under what class do we put the 
class, orange? Fruits, you say. And this class 
we may put under vegetable kingdom, and this 
again under living things, and this under every- 
thing. And what higher class have we for 
everything? We find no higher class; this is the 
most general, includes in its widest sense all that 
we can perceive or think of, only we set opposite 
another class, nothing. Everything and nothing 
are thus our most general ideas, or concepts as 
we sometimes call them. 

Suppose I ask you to tell me your idea of a 
dog, and you say, " My idea of a dog is: an ani- 
mal with four legs, having a tail, is covered with 
hair, is from one to three feet high, and has a 
rather sharp-pointed nose." To anything you 
saw with these qualities you would give the 
name of dog. This definite setting out your 
idea of anything, as dog, we call defining. And 
notice how your definition of dog is made : You 
give the next higher class " animal," and then 
you give the qualities which distinguish it from 
other animals. Now the definition of dog which 
you have given answers very well for animals you 
commonly see, but if you go to a menagerie you 
see wolves and other animals which come under 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 25 

your definition of dog. A specially trained man 
of very careful and wide observation is required 
to make a correct definition of a dog, and such a 
man we call a scientist. Science is a knowledge 
of things set out*in definite form by trained men 
who have made long and thorough and special 
investigations. Psychology is a science not as 
the common knowledge and belief about con- 
sciousness, but so far as it is a body of knowledge 
about consciousness gained by specialists. 

How do we gain a knowledge of consciousness? 
Can we see our mental acts with our eyes? Sup- 
pose that when you are looking at the orange on 
the table I ask, "What are you doing?" You 
answer, "I am looking at the orange." That is, 
you are aware of the orange and aware of aware- 
ness and that it isyour awareness; you are directly 
aware of your own consciousness, which is in this 
case a seeing and perceiving the orange. So also 
when you hear, or remember, or imagine, or think, 
you are conscious of it; and if interrupted in your 
mental operation by some one asking what you 
are doing, you can at once reply, / am imagining, 
etc., as the case may be. This being conscious 
of consciousness and of self we call introspec- 
tion, and Psychology, which is the special knowl- 
edge of consciousness, is an introspective science. 
And it is plain that introspection is of the greatest 
service to us, especially as it is implied both in 



/ 



26 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

remembering our experience and in anticipating 
experience, as the second morning on remem- 
bering what the orange looked like, etc., and in 
expecting how it would feel, taste, etc. That is, 
consciousness of consciousness present, past, and 
future is implied in knowledge in general. 
While it is the usual case that persons know 
their own mental operations, yet sometimes we 
see very uneducated people who seem largely 
unconscious of their consciousness. Thus they 
seem often to be angry without being aware that 
they are angry and they have no memory of 
their anger. 

Now the anticipation of experience which is 
so constantly useful to us and which involves in- 
trospection, as when we expect an orange to 
taste sweet for we know what a sweet taste is, in- 
volves another mental process which must be 
mentioned. You see and taste round-yellows 
(that is, oranges) several times, and you conclude 
that all round-yellows are sweet Suppose the 
first time you saw oranges there were several 
on the plate. You taste the first and find it 
sweet, the second, and find it sweet, and so on. 
Now when you come to the seventh orange you 
will confidently expect this to be sweet. But 
even because the first tastes sweet you may ex- 
pect the second to be sweet also, but the more 
experiences of sweet you have, the more cer- 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 27 

tain you will feel about it. This concluding 
from one instance or more to all instances of a 
kind is called induction. 

Orange number i is sweet, 



Therefore all round-yellow things, which we 
name oranges, are sweet. 

The more often we find certain sight quali- 
ties, as round, associated with certain tastes, 
as sweet, the more confident will we be in our 
expectation when we next see a round-yellow 
thing, that it will taste sweet. If we make an 
induction from one or a few experiences we make 
a hasty induction, for we have often found such 
induction to be not trustworthy: 

Point out the induction in the last clause of the pre- 
ceding sentence. Why do you expect the sun to rise 
to-morrow morning? Writedown three expectations or 
inductions you have made to-day, for example, as regards 
affairs at breakfast, school, etc. Were these founded on 
many experiences or few? 

This process of induction is merely a process 
of forming ideas, in this case the idea of orange, 
as being round-yellow-sweet thing. You also 
notice that you proceed from this orange to all 
oranges as sweet, from particular instances to 



28 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

universal statement. Now having once the idea 
of round-yellow-sweet, as called orange, we may 
conclude from it, if we see a round-yellow, that 
it is sweet. 

All round-yellows are sweet; 
This is a round-yellow; 
Therefore this is sweet. 

We are constantly appealing in this way to our 
general ideas to interpret our particular experi- 
ences, and we call this process from general to 
particular deduction. We say we are reason- 
ing when we are making inductions or deduc- 
tions. 

If a friend offers you an orange and you then without 
hesitation take and eat it, what process of reasoning 
does this imply? Write it out in full. 



Knowing. - 

We have thus got four important methods of 
appreciating and understanding our surround- 
ings, by sensation, perception, memory and idea- 
ation, and ourselves by introspection, all which 
forms of consciousness we call knowing. 

Standing outside your house, but not looking 
directly at it but sidewise, you will notice how 
you have a dim awareness, a sensation of a blotch 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 29 

of color which is the paint of your house; turn- 
ing and looking directly at it you will perceive 
your house; shutting your eyes, you call up your 
house in memory* and you can form an idea of 
any house. 

Carry this four-fold exercise out in the same way for 
some other convenient object, as dog, locomotive. Can 
you have an image of something you never perceived? 
Can you have an idea of anything which cannot be 
perceived ? 

Feeling and Will. 

A little child is walking along the railway 
track, it sees the engine coming as plainly as you 
do, yet it does not know that harm and maybe 
death is coming, and fearlessly toddles on to 
destruction ; but you on seeing the engine are 
afraid, and jump aside. If we had no emotions 
like fear to come after the seeing and prompt 
the quick action, the mere seeing would be of no 
use. And so no amount of mere perception or 
memory or ideation by itself is in general useful 
unless it stirs what we call emotion, fear for 
example. 

Give four other examples of the use of emotion. 

This mentaTprocess we call emotion follows 
on mere knowledge as awareness, or we often 
speak of the two kinds of mental process as the 



30 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

intellect and feelings. When we have an emo- 
tion about what we perceive or what we think of, 
we say we are interested in it ; on the other hand 
unless we have some interest we will not per- 
ceive or think, that is emotion and knowledge 
are not separate, but act together and rely on 
each other. Thus in plain daylight you walk 
along the street without noticing things in par- 
ticular, but at night you look sharply for fear of 
holes or thieves. You merely think of possible 
harm from a thief, and you have slight fear, and 
if you remember that some one was robbed here 
a few days ago your fear is much stronger, and 
if you see what you take to be a robber coming, 
you have intense fear and run hastily in the 
other direction. Now we note that in all this 
experience the basis of fear is the memory of 
harm or pain. When we see a thing and have a 
memory of pain in connection with it we fear 
it, if memory of pleasure, we desire it. These 
seem the fundamental emotion reactions from 
memories of pain and pleasure, and so also from 
anticipation of pain and pleasure. If you threaten 
a boy with a stick he may show fear or be angry 
— anger is almost as fundamental as fear — if you 
offer him an orange he will show desire. 

Describe three fears you have lately had. How did 
your regard for pain come in? Analyze your experience 
this morning for complex of emotion-knowledge, as 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 31 

thus: "I awoke, saw it was late, was afraid of missing 
breakfast, etc., etc." Give three instances of fear you 
have noticed among animals. 

Our perceiving^and our thinking of things and 
persons start in us many other emotions than 
fear, anger and desire, and emotions of great use 
in life, but psychologists have not as yet made a 
thorough study of the emotion side of conscious- 
ness, and little is scientifically known here. But 
the expression of the emotions has been a good 
deal studied by the great naturalist, Charles 
Darwin, and by other scientists. You say you 
know when a person is afraid by the way he 
looks and acts. 

Give the signs of fear you have noticed. 

Now why should these signs appear? Darwin 
showed that many of them while not now of use 
might once have been of use and have been con- 
tinued as mere survivals till this time. Thus the 
heart beating rapidly in fear is probably con- 
nected with the fact that for thousands of years 
men in fear have fled from the object of their 
fear as rapidly as possible, and this running, of 
course, caused the heart to beat very rapidly. 
So even now when we are much afraid the heart 
beats rapidly even though we are not running 
away. 

But do we find consciousness to be only kinds 



32 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

of emotion with pain or pleasure and kinds of 
knowledge? Can you suggest any mental state 
which does not come under these heads? You 
see the orange, you desire it, but if you are too 
lazy to put out your hand and take it, you may 
go without. We constantly have emotions which 
do not result at once in actions because we do 
not put forth the effort. This making an effort 
we call the will state of consciousness. 

Write three recent cases of effort in your experience, 
with their emotion and knowledge states. 

To be sure, we certainly do many things, 
walking, for instance, without making an effort, 
but in walking fast and racing we make great 
efforts. Actions with effort we call work, actions 
without effort, play, as when walking for pleas- 
ure, or habit, as in walking to school. 

Mention three instances each of work, play and habit, 
in to-day's experience. 

The first time a duck is in the water it swims, 
and we say it swims instinctively. It did not 
practice and so get the habit of swimming, as a 
boy learns to swim. Action which happens at 
once on the first sensation, perception, etc., 
and so does not need to be learned, we call 
instinctive. 

Name five instinctive actions you have noticed in men 
or animals. 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 33 

Emotion as moving us to action we call 
motive, as in the case of intellect we call it 
interest. The motive becoming very strong 
we are led to make an effort to attain the end, 
we exercise will-power. If an orange were hung 
from the ceiling much above my head, I might 
want it bad enough to make a very severe effort 
in jumping to reach it. Now, in activity of this 
kind we say we are doing as we please, we can 
jump or not. I may decide or choose to jump 
or the contrary. The will is free when it has an 
alternative, and in adopting or carrying out our 
choice we are exercising will, and there is effort 
as against the contrary motive which is still felt. 
Thus, though it may be perfectly easy for me to 
put out my hand and take the orange on the 
table when I want it, yet if I feel it may make 
me sick, or that some one else should have it, 
it requires a real mental effort as against these 
motives which lead me to leave the orange 
alone. Thus will is action going against some 
opposition ; and, when feeling we can go in 
some other direction, we say our wills are free. 
Even the slave is free though he has the hardest 
alternative, either to do his master's will or to 
kill himself. 

Now although we feel so free in our will activ- 
ities, we may be told by some that we are not 
free, but the strongest motive at the time con- 



34 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

trols our act, and we act of necessity as this 
moves us. You do not take the orange as you 
choose, but because your desire, being stronger 
than other motives at the moment, forces you. 
Now how should forces act? If you remain 
quietly standing, and one person pushes you 
from one side, and another pushes stronger 
from the other side, will you be moved in the 
direction of the stronger push? No. You 
find, when you are pushed by both, that both 
influence the direction, and if the pushes are 
equally strong and not in exactly opposite direc- 
tions you move in a path midway between the 
two directions. So if motives are merely forces 
we should expect the same law to hold. If 
your desire for the orange just equals in force 
your feeling that your sick brother should have 
the orange, you give him half, if greater you 
give him less, and it should only be when the 
feeling for the brother goes down to zero, that 
you would take the whole orange, or when your 
desire goes down to zero point in force, that 
you would give him the whole. But it is a fact, 
is it not, that you often desire a thing very 
strongly and yet give it away, or yet keep it? 
That is in many instances the law of forces does 
not apply. But in all cases you feel free whether 
to take the whole or part of the orange. And 
the real reason that we feel forced when some 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 35 

one pushes us, but in the case of motives feel 
perfectly free in what we are doing, is that our 
motives are part of ourselves. The motive is not 
something outside of us, but is our own conscious- 
ness in its activity. We act necessarily yet freely 
to ourselves according to what we are. With 
regard to the old puzzle of the freedom of the 
will psychology does not pronounce, but merely 
seeks to understand how we feel and act as free. 
Action includes any form of will, and even 
knowing is a form of action moved by feeling. 
You learn the lesson because you have some 
interest either in the lesson itself, or in getting 
a good mark, or some other similar emotion 
impels you. But while most actions are impelled 
by your feelings, some are not. When some one 
thrusts his hand toward your eye, you wink 
involuntarily, and such action which is so im- 
mediate on sensation and without emotion, is 
called reflex action. So when the duck swims 
instinctively or the boy by habit, the sensation of 
the water immediately starts the action, and 
little if any emotion seems to come in. So 
images and ideas may also start action without 
emotion, as when we are writing a letter and 
some one speaks to us we are almost sure to 
mechanically put down the words we hear in the 
letter, though often entirely inappropriate. Action 
controlled in this way directly by percept or 



36 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

image or idea is called ideo-motor action. A 
great deal of imitation and of action by sugges- 
tion is of this sort. It must also be borne in 
mind that many psychologists do not now regard 
actions as in general impelled by emotions, but 
that the emotion merely expresses the action, 
that you strike not because you are angry, but 
you are angry because you strike. According to 
this school of scientists our actions control our 
emotions, or at most our emotions merely 
accompany our actions. 

The kinds of consciousness we have found 
may be thus set down: 

fSensation 

"Object \ Perception 

f Image 
[_ Representation < 
Knowing-! ( Idea 

Subject or self. i. Consciousness of 
self, and, 2, of consciousness. 
Feeling. 
Will-acts. 

Special Forms of Psychology. 

We have thus far studied consciousness 
merely in its main forms which are of direct 
use in our daily life, the forms which are of 
use in the struggle of existence, and we have 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 37 

observed the order of consciousness from 
sensation to will and given some simple 
analysis. We have been concerned with an 
introduction to the Biological Psychology of 
human beings, adolescent or adult, as observed 
in others, or noted by introspection in ourselves. 
But there are other forms of consciousness and 
other ways of studying consciousness. One way 
of studying consciousness which has been carried 
out of late years is from the point of view of 
Physics, and hence this department is called 
Psychophysics. Weber's law is an example of 
psychophysical study of consciousness, for here 
we study the relation of physical intensities to 
psychical. The measurement of the time of the 
mental processes is another instance of psycho- 
physics. We all know that it takes time to think, 
that some people see quicker than others, and in 
all their mental operations are more rapid than 
others. If a wheel half-black and half-white is 
turned rapidly it is found that at a certain rapid- 
ity the colors fuse into grey, and that it must be 
turned slow enough to give about 1-40 of a second 
between the black and white sides to notice the 
black or the white. What word do you supply 

when I say black and ? To give the word 

white or some simple association takes about 
half a second with most persons. 

As Psychophysics deals with the relation of 



38 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

consciousness to physical measures of intensity, 
time, space, and so on, Physiological Psychology 
deals with the relation of mental processes to 
the bodily processes, particularly to nervous proc- 
ess. It is now believed that every conscious- 
ness is connected with nervous process, some 
scientists thinking that the nerve change causes 
the consciousness, others that the consciousness 
causes the nervous process; and others think 
that neither is the effect of the other, but both 
are parallel processes, the one merely going 
along with the other. The relation of mind to 
nerve is popularly recognized when a man of 
great mind is called a man of brains. Particu- 
lar parts of the brain have by experiment and 
observation been connected with particular forms 
of mental action. In general, we may say that 
the back portions have been connected with 
sensory activity, the middle portion with motor, 
and the forward portion with higher modes like 
thought. Physiological Psychology also investi- 
gates the particular part which the different 
elements of the sense organs contribute to sen- 
sation; for example, by what elements in the eye 
vision of color is brought about. So also Physi- 
ological Psychology studies the relation of men- 
tal activity to all organs of the body; for example, 
of thought to the lung action, of fear to the 
heart action. 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 39 

Pathological Psychology is the division which 
deals with forms of consciousness which are not 
useful to life and are often directly harmful, as 
in mental diseases or insanity. The most com- 
mon form of such consciousness is the dream. 
Dreams are associations of images, thoughts, 
and other kinds of consciousness which, happen- 
ing when we are asleep, seem to us to be real 
perceptions and activities in a real world. But 
when we awake we see that they were mere 
illusions and have no significance for the real 
world of our life. Thus, though some people 
think there is a value in dreams, yet scientists 
now regard them as being of no real value to 
life. Dreams are occasioned either by some 
disturbance within the body, as a difficulty in 
breathing, or by some external stimulus, as 
heliotrope perfume smelled when asleep leads 
one to dream of flowers. 

Another form of abnormal consciousness which 
has been much studied by scientists of late years 
is artificial sleep, or hypnosis. Here is a typical 
case: " Mr. X., forty-one years old, seats himself 
on a chair. I tell him that he must try to sleep; 
'Think of nothing but that you are to go to 
sleep.' After some seconds I continue: * Now 
your eyelids are beginning to close; your eyes 
are growing more and more fatigued ; the eye- 
lids quiver more and more. You feel tired all 



4<D PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

over; your arms go to sleep; your legs grow 
tired ; a feeling of heaviness and the desire for 
sleep takes possession of your whole body. 
Your eyes close ; your head feels dull ; your 
thoughts grow more and more confused. Now 
you can no longer resist ; now your eyelids are 
closed. Sleep!' After the eyelids close I ask 
him if he can open them. (He tries to do so, 
but they are too heavy.) I raise his left arm 
high in the air. (It remains in the air, and can- 
not be brought down, in spite of his efforts.) I 
ask him if he is asleep. 'Yes.' ' Fast asleep ¥ 
' Yes.' ' Do you hear the canary singing?' ' Yes/ 
' Now you hear the concert?' 'Certainly.' Upon 
this I take a black cloth and put it in his hand. 
'You feel this dog quite plainly?' ' Quite plainly.' 
1 Now you can open your eyes. You will see the 
dog clearly. Then you will go to sleep again 
and not wake till I tell you.' (He opens his eyes, 
looks at the imaginary dog and. strokes it.) I 
take the cloth out of his hand and lay it on the 
floor. (He stands up and reaches out for it.) 
Although he is in my room, when I tell him he 
is in the Zoological Gardens he believes it, and 
sees trees, and so on." In hypnosis the subject 
is wholly at the command of the hypnotizer, and 
has any perception, etc., that the hypnotizer sug- 
gests. Hypnotism should be experimented on 
only by scientists and physicians. 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 41 

Psychical research is a form of psychology 
which hardly has as yet a full scientific standing. 
It studies telepathy, that is, supposed communi- 
cation between minds far separated or having no 
material connection; also, apparitions, clairvoy- 
ance and similar phenomena. Its results, from 
the very nature of the inquiry, demand subjec- 
tion to the closest scrutiny. 

Another department of Psychology to which 
much attention is now being paid is Evolutionary 
Psychology, which traces the origin and growth 
of the several kinds and forms of consciousness. 
This includes child study as a tracing the devel- 
opment of mental process from infancy to adult 
life, as also the study of consciousness in animal 
life up through the savage life to that of ordinary 
civilized men. The study of mind in animals is 
usually called Comparative Psychology, and the 
study of mind in the lower races of mankind is 
called Ethnic Psychology. It is now generally 
considered by scientists that the higher ani- 
mals have all the kinds of consciousness man 
has, though not in general so highly developed. 
Many observations have of late years been made 
of children from the day of birth and on, in an 
attempt to understand how their minds develop. 
Everything so familiar to us as chair, carpet, 
table, etc., is new and strange to the infant, and 
it spends most of its waking time learning things* 



42 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 



what they mean, and learning the use of its 
hands and eyes. By many experiences it gradu- 
ally learns its body as itself, it finds by grasping 
its toes and fingers that there comes a different 
sensation than when it grasps the rungs of a 
chair, and that its body is peculiarly connected 
with its own experience. Here is an instance 
taken from Preyer's studies of his own child: 
"Sixty-second week — Playing with his own fin- 
gers (at which he looks with a protracted gaze) 
as if he would pull them off. Again, one hand 
is pressed down by the other flat upon the table 
until it hurts, as if the hand were a wholly for- 
eign plaything; and it is still looked at wonder- 
ingly sometimes. From this time forth the gaz- 
ing at the parts of his own body was perceptibly 
lessened. The child knew them as to their form, 
and gradually learned to distinguish them from 
foreign objects as parts belonging to himself." 

Social Psychology is that division which stud- 
ies social consciousness in all its forms, in the 
family relations, in political, and in all social 
relations. It shows how a crowd is moved by 
what seems one consciousness, and how societies 
of all kinds have a psychological basis. 

The psychology which we specially studied 
has concerned itself with consciousness as useful 
to us in the ordinary struggle of life, in making 
a living, in helping us to hold our own and 



PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 43 

advance in the competition for a livelihood and 
worldly success. But while consciousness is pri- 
marily biological; that is, is a means by which 
we preserve and ^dvance our bodily life, there is 
a higher consciousness which exists for its own 
sake. Thus, a man who seeks knowledge not 
merely because it will be useful to him, but 
for its own sake, is the true scientist. Knowl- 
edge for its own sake is science, thought for 
its own sake is philosophy, sensing, perceiving, 
and imagining for its own pleasure is aesthetics 
and fine art, action for its own sake is ethics, 
feeling and action in view of the Infinite Being 
is religion. Thus, not mere smartness, force, 
and notoriety, but truth, beauty, righteousness 
and holiness become the ideals of life, and life 
is used to promote these highest and latest forms 
of consciousness in contrast with consciousness 
being for the mere use of life. It belongs very 
largely to the Psychology of the future to ana- 
lyze and interpret these higher forms of con- 
sciousness, and thus to construct the Higher 
Psychology. 

Psychology is as yet too imperfect to have 
reached definite application as a practical 
science. We have no Practical Psychology as 
we have Economic Botany or Geology, though 
there is some approach to it in Education. Yet 
it is plain that Psychology has a vast field of 



44 PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS. 

most important application, especially in social 
and ethical directions. In general, it is also 
plain that he who looks scientifically, that is, 
thoroughly and without prejudice, into his own 
mind, will be prepared for self-control toward 
the highest ends; and he who looks scientifically 
into the minds of others, finding a vast variety 
of individuality unlike his own, is prepared to be- 
come tolerant, thoughtful, considerate, magnani- 
mous. The study of Psychology should make 
us broad-minded, deep-minded, high-minded. 



THE OPEN COURT 

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE 

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and 
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea. 



THE OPEN COURT does not understand by religion any creed or dog- 
matic belief, but man's ^odd-conception in so far as it regulates his conduct. 

The old dogmatic conception of Religion is based upon the science of past 
ages ; to base religion upon the maturest and truest thought of the present 
time is the object of The Open Court. Thus, the religion of The Open Courtis 
the Religion of Science, that is, the religion of verified and verifiable truth. 

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